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Abstract
The web bots have been blamed for consuming
large amount of Internet traffic and undermining
the interest of the scraped sites for years. Tra-
ditional bot detection studies focus mainly on
signature-based solution, but advanced bots usu-
ally forge their identities to bypass such detection.
With increasing cloud migration, cloud providers
provide new opportunities for an effective bot de-
tection based on big data to solve this issue. In this
paper, we present a behavior-based bot detection
scheme called BotGraph that combines sitemap and
convolutional neural network (CNN) to detect inner
behavior of bots. Experimental results show that
BotGraph achieves ∼95% recall and precision on
35-day production data traces from different cus-
tomers including the Bing search engine and sev-
eral sites.
1 Introduction
According to Incapsula’s report [Incapsula, 2016], about
51.8% of Internet traffic in 2016 are performed by automatic
bots instead of human. These bots include search engines,
price scrappers, Email harvesters and even Trojan which
could launch DDoS attacks. These bots not only cause the
leakage of business data, but also consume significant band-
width and server overload. For the past few years, as more
businesses migrate their websites to clouds, it becomes the
responsibility of the cloud provider to offer an effective bot
mitigation solution for its customers.
Based on whether authentication is required, most com-
monly seen bots can be partitioned into two broad categories:
social bots, which target for social networks and web bots,
which target for general websites. Compared to social bots,
detecting web bots is more challenging because of two rea-
sons. First, it is difficult to identity a website user (or bot)
as there is no concept like the user account (or hard to re-
trieve it as a cloud provider) in the web traffic. Leveraging
the client IP address seems to be a feasible method for user
identification, Nevertheless, it can be faked easily via proxy.
Second, social bot detection can be customized and tuned for
a specific social media. However, for web bots, especially as
a cloud provider, there would be millions of websites hosted
in the cloud. Each site provides distinct services to its cus-
tomers. Recognizing the bots among all the web traffic for
all sites requires a universal scheme that works for hetere-
ogenous scenarios. In this paper, we focus on the detection
of web bots. We use the term “bot” to refer to web bots in
following sections.
There are several traditional ways to perform bot detec-
tion, e.g., UserAgent blacklist, IP rate limiting, device fin-
gerprint recognition, etc. However, maintaining IP or User-
Agent blacklist requires huge effort to maintain the blacklist
database. Moreover, a bot can easily use a proxy IP address
or modify its UserAgent to a normal browser. Detecting de-
vice fingerprint such as mouse movement and JavaScript en-
gine validation is often a better way, but it usually relies on
client-side JavaScript code, which is an invasive technique.
Unfortunately, advanced bots can still bypass such detection
by utilizing real browser environments like headless Chrome.
In summary, all these methods rely on bot’s identities or fea-
ture codes, which can be easily bypassed by advanced bots
via faking their identities. Detecting bots via their behaviors
instead of their identities would be a better way.
In this paper, we categorize the features of web traffic into
two types: identity features and behavior features. Then
we introduce a behavior-based bot detection approach called
BotGraph. BotGraph is performed in three steps. First, we
define the concept of sitemap and propose three ways to build
the sitemap for a site. Second, each user session is mapped
to a subgraph of the sitemap. The subgraph contains infor-
mation about which URL patterns the client has visited and
the corresponding access frequencies. Third, a 2-dimensional
image is generated from the above subgraph. Thus the task
of bot detection has become an image classification problem.
We use the state-of-the-art techniques like CNN to classify
the images into two categories: bot or non-bot. We evaluate
BotGraph on various datasets including Bing search engine
and several sites from different industries. The result shows
that our method can achieve ∼95% precision and recall on
most of the datasets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 elaborates on the related work. Section 3 presents our
behavior-based bot detection scheme called BotGraph. Sec-
tion 4 brings the experimental results. Section 5 discusses
about our drawbacks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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Figure 1: Architecture of BotGraph.
2 Related Work
Bot detection is highly demanded for both website owners
and service providers. Google Analytics [Google, 2019]
provides built-in filters to help their customers filter bot re-
quests based on geolocation information of the client IP ad-
dress. Distil, Akamai and ShieldSquare are selected as three
leaders in the bot detection area, based on the whitepaper
published by Forrester [Forrester, 2018]. Akamai [Akamai,
2018] uses pre-defined bot signature database as well as a le-
gitimate service whitelist. It also allows its users to customize
bot detection rule. ShieldSquare [ShieldSquare, 2019] pro-
vides both identity-based and behavior-based bot detection.
The identity-based method utilizes client-side JavaScript to
collect parameters like browser fingerprints. The behavior-
based analysis is based on characteristic in terms of number
of pages visited per session, time spent on each page, fre-
quency of repeat visits, and so on. This is similar to our so-
lution, but we describe user behaviors in a graph based on
sitemap instead, which contains more unique features for a
client. Distil [Networks, 2018] provides several bot detec-
tion methods such as known violator blacklist, biometric data
validation like finger swiping and mouse movement. HTTP’s
UserAgent is used to recognize the category of the bots. They
also provide a machine-learning based method, which needs
to be trained for one week before being ready to use. How-
ever, UserAgent-based bot detection is not feasible for ad-
vanced bots, as they can easily hide themselves by modifying
its value.
For feature extraction, some network intrusion datasets
[KDD, 1999; CSIC, 2009; UNB, 2014] are provided as the
ground truth, some methods were brought out based on
which, A review [Jaafar et al., 2019] introduced a method
which encode the numerical features into holistic metrics like
total requests, standard deviative time and the percentage of
POST requests, a topic-based model latent dirichlet allocation
(LDA) was introduced [Lagopoulos et al., 2017] by Athana-
sios to encode the semantic information like words in the
URLs and postfix representing the type of target resource(eg.
html, pdf, asp) into digit feature vectors by introducing the
statistic-based concepts like topic variance and topic similar-
ity. Besides that, auto-encoder model [Zong et al., 2018] is
proposed to facilitate the feature extraction procedure. Deep-
Defense [Yuan et al., 2017] introduced an algorithm which
splited the traffic logs into several segments with the same
shape, then encoded the request information in each line of
segment to numerical matrix, which would then be fed to re-
current neural network (RNN) based model. Similar to Bot-
Graph, this model can capture the context information among
requests. However, the inference efficiency of RNN model
highly relies on the length of segments, while BotGraph can
perform much more stable.
For detection methods, an improved support vector ma-
chine (SVM) algorithm is [Scho¨lkopf et al., 1999] proposed
as the general approach, More recently, then a boost method
called XGBoost [Chen and Guestrin, 2016] is applied to im-
prove both the efficiency and accuracy of detection. Inspired
by the trend towards deep learning, the energy-based deep
learning model [Zhai et al., 2016] showed up, and GAN-
based model [Zenati et al., 2018] also dabbled in the scope
of anomaly detection.
Besides the CNN model used in this work, we also inves-
tigated using graph convolutional network (GCN) [Kipf and
Welling, 2016] to train the client’s behavior in the web traffic.
GCN is different with CNN by accepting structured graphs
instead of images as input. However, it is not suitable for our
scenario as it can only perform node classification inside one
graph instead of classifying multiple graphs.
Overall, most previous researches rely on identity features
such as client IP address or UserAgent for bot detection,
which can be easily defeated by advanced bots. A behavior-
based bot detection method should be proposed to differenti-
ate advanced bots from normal users.
3 Our Approach
3.1 Overview
The architecture of BotGraph is shown in Figure 1. There are
three steps: first, we need to build the sitemap for the site. We
provide three ways to do this. Second, we map the requests
in a session to a subgraph of the sitemap. Third, we gener-
ate the 2-dimensional trace image from the subgraph, which
transforms the bot detection task into an image classification
problem. Finally, we use CNN-based model to classify those
generated images into two categories: bot and non-bot. We
will provide the details of BotGraph as follows.
3.2 Basic Concepts
Request. In this paper, we use the term “request” to rep-
resent the HTTP request from the client to the server (aka
//cart
/displayCategory?
categoryId=*
/productDescription?
productId=*
/addToCart?
productId=*
/loginForm
/registerationForm
Figure 2: Sitemap of a simple online shopping site.
Field Description
Timestamp Request time, e.g., 2019-1-12 04:00:07
HttpMethod HTTP request method, e.g., GET, POST.
RequestUri The path in URL, e.g., /books/desc?id=1
Status HTTP status code, e.g., 200, 404.
Host “Host” field in request header.
UserAgent “User-Agent” field in request header.
ClientIp Client’s IP address.
Table 1: Request fields.
the site) together with the corresponding response. A request
usually contains many fields, a portion of which is shown in
Table 1.
Session. Bots usually scrape the pages with a large number
of requests. To describe such a behavior, a necessary pre-
processing step is partitioning the requests into sessions. A
session identifies a unique client (normal browser or bot) that
performs the accesses.
3.3 Features
For the bot detection task, there are two types of fields in a
request: identity fields and behavior fields.
Identity fields. Identity fields are used to identify the client
or server. Specifically, UserAgent, ClientIp are identity fields
for the client. Host is the identity field for the server.
Behavior fields. Behavior fields are used to describe the ac-
cess behavior of the client, including fields like RequestUri
and Status.
Currently, identity fields are widely used in traditional bot
mitigation schemes such as IP rate limiting and UserAgent
blacklisting. However, if the bots fake their identity through
using IP proxy pool, or tamper its UserAgent, those methods
would fail. Therefore, a feasible way would be detecting the
bots via their behavior instead of their identity. The behavior
fields used in BotGraph are as follows:
RequestUri, Status. These two fields play the central role
in describing a bot’s behavior. We map RequestUri of each re-
quest into a sitemap node. Status is used to determine whether
it is a valid mapping. The details would be discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5.
As BotGraph detects bots on a per-session basis, as input,
we assume the requests for a site are grouped into sessions
and sorted by Timestamp. Next we will introduce how we
perform bot detection based on sitemap and CNN.
3.4 Sitemap Retrieval
Google first introduced the Sitemaps protocol to describe a
site’s content [Google, 2005]. A sitemap is a XML file that
lists all the URLs for a site. It allows search engines to crawl
the site more efficiently. In this paper, we extend the list-
formatted sitemap into a graph. The sitemap for a site is de-
fined as: G = (V,E), in which:
• G: a directed graph.
• V : set of nodes. Each node represents a URL pat-
tern incorporating multiple URLS. For example, Both
/page?id=1 and /page?id=2 belong to the same pattern:
/page?id=*.
• E: set of directed edges from one node to another. Take
two nodes: v1 and v2 as example, if the HTML content
of the web page with pattern v1 has one or more hyper-
link (typically via HTML <a> tag) pointing to a URL of
pattern v2, then we say v1 has an edge to v2.
We show an example of sitemap for a simple online shop-
ping site [Shah, 2016] in Figure 2. This sitemap shows the
basic functionality of the site, including registration, login,
product view, cart, etc.
There are several ways to build the sitemap for a site, in-
cluding active crawling, passive sniffing and self-providing.
Active crawling. Active crawling requires to run a crawler
to build the sitemap of the site. The crawling typically starts
from the homepage and enters each hyperlink from the cur-
rent page recursively. Each URL pattern is retrieved only
once to reduce the number of pages need crawling. This is
based on the assumption that web pages with same URL pat-
tern have the same page structure and similar hyperlinks of
the same URL patterns.
Passive sniffing. In passive sniffing, the URLs of site’s traf-
fic are monitored, learned and then used to build the sitemap.
This scheme is less intrusive than active crawling. How-
ever, the sitemap may be incomplete limited by the amount
of sniffed traffic.
Self providing. The site provides its own sitemap for bot
detection. By this way we could gain the most precise
sitemap, but requires non-trivial work from the site owner.
3.5 Subgraph Mapping
As shown in Figure 1, we can map RequestUri of each re-
quest in a session into a node in the sitemap (in blue color).
For each node in sitemap, we use the term “access frequency”
to indicate the number of requests mapped to it. Moreover,
two adjacent requests in the session can determine an edge
in the sitemap (in solid line). Those mapped nodes and de-
termined edges form a subgraph of the original sitemap. The
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Figure 3: Performance on search engine dataset spanning 35 days.
Site #Nodes #Edges How Is It Retrieved
Search engine 542 73441 Self providing
News site 51 1473 Active crawling
University site 134 2498
Table 2: Sitemaps of our datasets.
generated subgraph contains information about the URL pat-
terns the client has visited as well as the corresponding access
frequencies.
There are occasions in which non-existent URLs are ac-
cessed and status code 404 is responded (see Request 6 in
Figure 1). This could be blamed for the bot’s attempts to ac-
cess a previously crawled and cached URL which has already
been removed, or just brute-force attacks against vulnerable
URLs like /backup.zip and /apmserv5.2.6.rar. These URLs
cannot be mapped to any node in the sitemap. To resolve this,
a node called “INVALID” is manually added to the sitemap
as a container of all non-existent URLs.
3.6 Image Generation
In this section, we discuss about how to generate the trace
image from a given subgraph in the section above. There are
two kinds of elements in the trace image: spot and line. The
procedure of image generation is described as follows: First
we draw the black-filled spot for each node in the subgraph,
the central coordinate and radius of which will be dwelt on
later. Then we draw the straight line to bridge each pair of
nodes containing an edge in original subgraph, the width of
which is a session-free constant.
Page Affinity
To determine the position of each node in the sitemap, we
use the Verlet algorithm [Verlet, 1967] to generate their coor-
dinates. The Verlet algorithm performs molecular dynamics
simulation based on Newton’s equation of motion. The intu-
ition is that a link between two nodes in the sitemap generates
an attractive force, which tends to make them nodes closer.
The algorithm use the iteration formula to reach the final bal-
anced states for all nodes. In this way, the affinity of original
web pages is visually exhibited on the generated sitemap.
It is notable that the coordinates are generated only once
for a sitemap (site) and shared by all the subgraphs derived
from this sitemap, which would not cause significant over-
head when processing lots of sessions.
Client Trace Images
Media-
metribot
AhrefsBot
Bingbot
Googlebot
Normal
Users
Table 3: Trace images of different sessions.
Access Frequency
The access frequency for each URL pattern is an important
feature for bot detection as a bot usually needs to access
certain type of pages repeatedly, e.g., scraping product de-
scription pages like /product?id=*. We use the spot radius to
represent such access frequency for a sitemap node. Define
r = f(x), r is the radius of the spot, x is the access frequency.
f(x) is supposed to meet the following rules:
• Higher access frequency results in larger node. So f(x)
is an increasing function.
• The smallest node (accessed only once) should also be
visible in the image. Thus we have f(1) = rmin.
• The largest node should not occupy too much space of
the image. Thus we have f(+∞) = rmax.
• The gradient of f(x) should be gentle when x is rela-
tively small. We can use f(xgate) = rgate to restrict it.
The gate is a chosen value.
Inspired by the sigmoid function, we design our own f(x)
as follows. Given rmin, rmax, xgate, rgate, the parameters of
a, b, c can be determined by solving the constrains above.
f(x) =
c
1 + eb−ax
(1)
4 Evaluation
4.1 Dataset
To evaluate BotGraph, we use datasets from real world web
server logs including Bing search engine and several sites
Dataset Type Requests Sessions Precision Recall Accuracy
#Total BoR (%) #Total BoS (%) (%) (%) (%)
Search engine (d: 0, hr: 0) Train 8212838 81.8 163811 73.5 99.5 99.6 99.3
Search engine (d: 5, hr: 0) Test 7541850 79.8 153464 68.8 95.0 95.6 93.5
News site (d: 0-3) Train 48606 78.4 4723 49.2 98.4 98.4 97.4
News site (d: 4-7) Test 52343 79.2 5070 51.6 98.0 96.9 95.7
University page (hr: 0-5) Train 250000 6.7 3837 7.5 97.8 93.8 99.4
University page (hr: 6-15) Test 250000 1.4 3754 4.7 95.3 69.1 98.4
Table 4: Performance on different datasets. BoR indicates the bot’s percentage of the total requests. BoS indicates the bot’s percentage of the
total sessions.
Device Type TH (session/s) LA (ms)
Intel Xeon E5620 CPU 3.67 103.60
Intel i7-8750H 8.76 50.44
Intel i7-7700 9.06 48.81
GTX 1050 Ti GPU 132.25 5.97
Tesla K40 220.84 1.62
Table 5: Efficiency on the news site dataset under different CPUs
and GPUs. TH is training throughput. LA is inference latency.
Scheme Precision (%) Recall (%) Accuracy (%)
SVM 82.4 32.6 97.9
XGBoost 71.0 92.5 68.9
AdaBoost 71.0 92.5 68.9
DT 68.8 100.0 68.8
RF 68.8 100.0 68.8
MLP 73.8 87.8 70.2
LSTM+ 35.0 81.4 95.1
SVM+ 75.8 94.5 75.5
XGBoost+ 86.8 98.9 88.8
AdaBoost+ 85.4 96.7 86.3
DT+ 85.9 98.7 87.9
RF+ 83.8 96.5 84.8
MLP+ 84.0 88.6 80.6
BotGraph 95.1 95.5 92.5
Table 6: Comparison with other bot detection methods on the search
engine dataset. The trailing + indicates the clientIp field is used as a
feature.
from different industries like news site, university homepage,
etc. As shown in the Dataset and Type columns, the train-
ing set of the search engine dataset is collected for a hour on
day 0. The testing set is for the same hour on day 5. These
logs have already been sessionized by tracking the SessionId
cookie of the client. Each session is labeled as bot or non-bot.
The dataset only includes sessions the images of which have
more than 3 spots, which will be explained in Section 5. The
labeling is performed as such: a team of 30+ professional en-
gineers manually analyzed the traffic and used various ways
including JavaScript support checking, mouse movement and
click tracking, IP reputation, UserAgent blacklisting to label
the traffic. In this paper, the labels are assumed to be accurate
and used as ground truth.
4.2 Setup
The sitemaps for each dataset are shown in Table 2. The
search engine dataset provides a PageName field, e.g., Home,
Page.Serp, Page.NoResults, Page.Image.Results, etc. So we
directly use it as the node in sitemap. Some random edges
are generated to make most of the nodes connected in the
sitemap. For other datasets, we used a crawler to actively
scrape their sitemaps. It is notable that the sitemap edges
have nothing to do with the subgraph edges. The sitemap
edges are site-wise and only used as input of Verlet algorithm
to generate the nodes’ coordinates. However, subgraph edges
are session-wise and used as a feature in the generated trace
images.
We use 256 × 256 as the image size. A padding of 5% is
added to the image’s four sides to ensure the spots cannot ex-
ceed the canvas easily. We empirically use rmin = 4, rmax =
80, xgate = 50, rgate = 50 in the access frequency function
f(x). The parameters of f(x) can be solved accordingly.
To classify the trace images, we tried different CNN mod-
els, including LeNet-5, AlexNet, ResNet, etc. They all get
similar precision and recall. Thus we choose the fastest
LeNet-5, a 7-level CNN to train and inference. The trace
images are used as input. The output is a scalar, indicat-
ing bot or non-bot. We use the following hyperparameters
in our experiments: BatchSize = 64, Epoch = 100, LR =
0.01, SGDMomentum = 0.5. Our training code is open
sourced at: https://github.com/botrainer/botrainer.
4.3 Performance
Although a bot can easily modify its UserAgent to pretend a
normal browser, A client with UserAgent claiming to be a bot
Category Trace Images
False Positives
False Negatives
Table 7: Trace images of false positives & false negatives.
is usually for real. So we use the claimed UserAgent of each
trace image (aka session) as a group key and show several
groups of randomly selected trace images in Table 3. We find
these images have described the client’s behavior pretty well
in the following two aspects:
1. The trace images of the same bot share high similarity.
Different bots have distinct image patterns.
2. The trace images of normal users have different shapes,
which are usually not the same as those of bots.
The performance of BotGraph on different datasets is
shown in Table 4. besides precision, recall and accuracy,
we also present two interesting metrics which are related to
the bot detection result: bot’s percentage of requests (BoR)
and bot’s percentage of sessions (BoS). BoR and BoS
are usually not the same value but highly related. When
BoS ≥ 49%, we usually have BoR > BoS. This is because
the session length (number of requests) of a bot is larger than
that the session length of a normal user on average. So when
bots are significant in a traffic, this pattern is more obvious.
However, when BoS < 10%, the existing bots are usually
unorganized and with no harmful intention, like Googlebot,
Bingbot, etc. They do not crawl very large number of pages
in a session, which is not significantly different from normal
users. For the datasets with BoS ≥ 49%, BotGraph achieves
higher than 95% precision and recall. It means when a site
is heavily affected by bots, BotGraph can effectively detect
those bot traffic. For the datasets with BoS < 10%, Bot-
Graph still gets higher than 95% precision with nearly 70%
recall. We think it is because the bot traffic in such sites are
scattered and have no stable patterns, which influences our
effect.
Our CNN-based model for image classification is imple-
mented in PyTorch. We benchmarked the training and in-
ference performance in different circumstances on the previ-
ously mentioned news site’s dataset, as shown in Table 5. We
can see that under an ordinary GPU, BotGraph does not cause
obvious latency compared to the common round-trip delay of
50∼100 ms on Internet.
4.4 Comparison
We compared BotGraph with other bot detection meth-
ods like long short-term memory (LSTM), SVM, XGBoost
[Lagopoulos et al., 2017], AdaBoost, decision tree (DT), ran-
dom forest (RF), multi-layer perceptron (MLP), etc. Some
methods are proposed in previous work and some others are
implemented by ourselves. The experiment is done on the
dataset of news site, as shown in Table 6. we also present
the request fields that each method uses. We use the follow-
ing feature engineering approach for each field: UserAgent is
parsed into tuple (Browser,OS,Device). ClientIp (IPv4) is
directly used in its 32-bit integer form. For fairness, we also
add the session length as a feature, which is similar to the
access frequency of BotGraph. We provide both results with
and without the ClientIp feature. It shows that most meth-
ods have no more than 75% precision without ClientIp and
87% precision with ClientIp. It is also notable that BotGraph
uses neither ClientIp nor UserAgent as features, but achieves
∼95% precision and recall.
5 Discussion
A weakness of BotGraph is when the number of spots in trace
images is pretty small (e.g., < 3), the detection result can be
wrong. It is because the normal users and bots are more likely
to have similar page browsing behaviors when only one or
two page patterns are accessed. We show several randomly
selected false positives and false negatives in Table 7. We can
see some images of false positives are nearly the same as the
images of false negatives. We believe this drawback is not
severe, considering bots are harmful largely due to their large
amount of traffic caused to the site. In fact, we found that
for more than 95% of the sessions with 1∼2 spots, their ac-
cess frequency is also minimized by accessing each page only
once. We think a bot which only makes one or two requests
in total will do no harm to the site.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Website bots have been proven to be a severe threat for In-
ternet these years. In this paper, BotGraph provides a novel
scheme to describe bot behaviors in 2-dimensional images.
Then state-of-the-art image classification methods like CNN
can be used to determine whether a sesison is a bot. The ex-
periments on real-world 35-day datasets show that BotGraph
is a very effective model to detect bots: it achieves ∼95%
both in precision and recall. BotGraph leverages the client’s
behavior instead of its identity as features, it is a promis-
ing way to detect advanced bots that frequently change their
identities. Currently, we are working on more generic graph-
based classification method to take advantage of underlying
general graph related feature to better describe the character-
istics of bots.
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